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PATENTS AND COMPETITION LAW:
IDENTIFYING JURISDICTIONAL METES
AND BOUNDS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT
-J

Sai Deepak

Abstract The primary object of this article is to understand
the relationship between patent rights and competition law under
the existing Indian legal framework. It has become imperative
to elucidate the legal position on the interplay between the two,
in light of growing antitrust concerns arising out of the exercise
of patent rights. The author has employed conventional principles of statutory interpretation to the relevant provisions of the
Patents Act, 1970 and the Competition Act, 2002 to arrive at his
conclusions, with Expert Committee Reports playing a corroborative role.

I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Competition law are usually perceived as sharing an uneasy relationship given their seemingly contrasting goals.
However, to pit one against the other without qualifications and riders may not
do justice to the nuances of their respective natures, roles and goals. The system
of IPRs is premised on the assumption that grant of exclusive rights for a limited
term is desirable to promote dynamic competition, which pushes the envelope of
innovation and thereby contributes to enlarging the basket of choices available to
consumers. In other words, in theory, incentivising innovation through IPRs elevates the level of competition from static to dynamic, which is in contrast to the
adversarial perception of IPRs and competition law. That being said, in practice,
even the most stringently regulated right is susceptible to abuse at the hands of
a determined and motivated right owner to the detriment of healthy competition.
This necessitates the existence of a safety valve in the form of competition law.
Simply put, the goal of competition law with respect to IPRs is to ensure that
the said species of rights are exercised within the limits prescribed by law and
in a manner which is beneficial to consumers and which promotes competition.
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Therefore, an IP owner runs into conflict with competition law only in the event
of a transgression in his capacity as an IP owner if such transgression distorts
competition. The validity of this general proposition in the Indian context will be
examined and tested in specific relation to patent rights in the ensuing portions
of this article. The aim is to ascertain if the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Competition Act") has indeed been vested with the power to
check restrictive and abusive trade practices resorted to by a patentee, and if so,
to what extent.
II. TREATMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS
BY THE PATENTS ACT, 1970
The scope of a patent right is governed by Section 48 of the Patents Act whose
language makes it clear that the right so granted under the statute is not absolute. In fact, the provision expressly states that the right granted by and under
Section 48 is "subject to other provisions" of the Patents Act and the conditions
specified in Section 47.' These "other provisions" include exceptions and defences
to infringement of patents under Sections 107 and 107A,2 and the right of the
Central Government to use and acquire patented inventions under Section 1003.
In addition to the said provisions, Section 140 enumerates those restrictive covenants which could render patent-related agreements unlawful.4 It is pertinent to
note that Section 140 does not specify the authority/forum which has the power
to invalidate such restrictive covenants or agreements containing any of the
proscribed restrictive covenants. Importantly, it does not vest the Controller of
Patents with the express power to invalidate such restrictive covenants.
Of particular interest to the instant discussion is Chapter XVI of the Patents
Act which provides for grant of Compulsory Licenses ('CLs') under various circumstances, subject to conditions spelt out therein. The general principles applicable to the practice/working of patented inventions, as enumerated in Section 83,
serve as guiding lights in understanding the purpose behind the grant of both patents and CLs, under the statute. Reproduced below is the said provision:
"83. General principles applicable to working of patented
inventions. Without prejudice to the other provisions contained
in this Act, in exercising the powers conferred by this Chapter,
regard shall be had to the following general considerations,
namely;
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(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the
inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest
extent that is reasonablypracticablewithout undue delay;
(b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly
for the importation of the patented article;
(c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations;
(d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition and should act as instrument to promote public interest specially in
sectors of vital importancefor socio-economic and technologicaldevelopment of India;
(e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in
taking measures to protectpublic health;
(J) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving
title or interest on patentfrom the patentee, and the patentee or a person
deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee does not resort to
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology; and
(g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention
available at reasonably affordable prices to the public."5
Based on a plain and literal reading of the Section, it is evident that not only
does it set out the obligations of a patentee, but also the broad considerations
that go into the grant of CLs by the Controller. Pertinently, abuse of patent rights
and adoption of restrictive trade practices by the patentee are express considerations in the grant of CLs, as mentioned in sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 84.6
Further, Section 83 imposes a positive obligation, requiring the patentee to make
the patented invention available to the public at "reasonably affordable prices".
That being said, it is important to note that the aforementioned provisions
of Chapter XVI only go so far as to state that in granting a CL, the Controller
shall have regard to anti-competitive practices resorted to by the patentee. In
other words, a CL may be granted by the Controller to remedy an anti-competitive practice of the patentee. However, none of these provisions specify as to who
has the power to adjudicate and conclude that a certain practice of a patentee is
anti-competitive or amounts to abuse of the patentee's position of dominance. The
5
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provision that sheds a modicum of light on the jurisdictional aspect of this issue
is Section 90(1)(ix) of the Patents Act which envisages the grant of a CL "to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrativeprocess to be anti-competitive"7 . It is worth noting that this provision does not expressly speak of the
Controller as having the power to adjudicate on the competitive or anti-competitive nature of the patentee's conduct, as the case may be. In fact, it appears to
refer to a forum or body other than the Controller of Patents. In other words, it
could be argued that the reference to a "judicial or administrative process" in the
provision is a reference to adjudication by the Competition Commission either
under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Competition Act which deal with anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance respectively. Pertinently, such
an interpretation would be consistent with the recommendations of Justice N.
Rajagopala Ayyangar in the Report on the Revision of the Patents Law submitted
in 1959 (popularly known as the Ayyangar Committee Report), which forms the
basis of the Patents Act, 1970.
In Paragraphs 190-203 of the Report, Justice Ayyangar has identified three
types of abuses, namely (a) abuse of patent rights through non-working and
importation, (b) abuse of patent rights to extend monopoly through insertion of
conditions for sale, lease or license of the patented processes/products, and (c)
use of patents or a group of patents to form monopolistic cartels and combinations to control production and distribution. Grant of Compulsory Licenses has
been identified as the measure to counter the first type of abuse. To deal with
the second type of abuse, a provision on the lines of the current Section 140 was
recommended. However, for the third type of abuse, which he rightly recognized
as resulting from excessive concentration of economic power, Justice Ayyangar
recommended the creation of a separate legislation and constitution of a separate
commission. Extracted below are the relevant portions of the Report:
"200. I have set out these facts to emphasise that monopolistic combinations and restrictive trade practices are a universal feature of capitalistic economy and that special legislation
is needed to protect the public from these practices. The rule
enacted in Section 27 of the Indian ContractAct regardingcontracts in restraint of trade is much too weak to touch even the
fringe of the problem.
201. I am however, not dealing with this matter in any detail for
two reasons; first, though patents might sometimes form a convenient nuclei on which monopolistic combinations (and restrictive practices which are the concomitant of combinations and
to effectuate which the combination might come into existence)
are based, the problem cannot be solved by any amendment of
Patents Act, S. 90 (1970).
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the Patents law but only by dealing with it comprehensively so
as to touch the manifoldforms which these combinations might
assume and in which they could operate. This has been the
manner in which legislation in other countries has tackled the
problem and with reason. There are no materials available on
the basis of which this information could be gathered. It does
not need any argument to establish, that without an evaluation
of the evil, its nature and extent, the remedy to counter it cannot be devised.
.... 203. I would therefore recommend the appointment of a
commission to enquire into its existence of monopolies in the
country in the sense in which the term is understood in this
field of the law and the prevalence of restrictive trade practices which are detrimental to the interests of the public generally and to suggest measures to remedy the evil if found to
exist. In the context of large scale industrialisationof the country that is proceeding apace, I consider that such an enquiry
would be found to yield fruitful results and constitute an assurance to the general public that the economic advantages resulting from the country's advance are being diverted to individual
aggrandisement."I'
These observations and recommendations of Justice Ayyangar reveal that the
Patents Act was never meant to deal with market distortion since the nature of
the enquiry is beyond the pale of the Act. Importantly, Justice Ayyangar struck
a distinction between abuse of patent rights by non-working and abuse of economic power accrued by virtue of holding of a patent or group of patents. While
the former is dealt with by the CL mechanism, the latter was meant to be looked
into by a separate commission having the necessary mandate and wherewithal
to deal with anticompetitive behaviour, which clearly points to the Competition
Commission. In light of this distinction, it becomes imperative to examine the
treatment of patent rights and patent-related abuse under the Competition Act.
III. TREATMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS
UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
Section 3 of the Competition Act9 expressly forbids any enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons from entering into any
agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or
control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an
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appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. The two exceptions to
this statutory injunction that have been carved out in the provision are:
(a) the Proviso to Section 3(3), which permits agreements entered into by way
of joint ventures ifthey result in increasing efficiency in production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of
services and;
(b) Section 3(5), which permits action taken by an 1P owner to restrain
infringement of her/his right, or "reasonable conditions" imposed by the
1P owner which are necessary for protection of any of her/his bundle of
rights which comprise the IP right. It is this exception which is of relevance to the instant discussion.
One school of thought believes that the exception carved out with respect to IP
rights in Section 3(5) is absolute, and results in the complete ouster of the application of the Competition Act to the conduct of IP owners, including patentees.
However, this position may not be correct since the limited window provided
for by the provision is with respect to action taken or "reasonable conditions"
imposed in connection with protection of IP rights. In other words, there must
be a real and reasonable nexus between the condition imposed on a third party
by an IP owner such as a patentee and the object of preventing infringement of
the IP right. Therefore, should the condition fail to pass muster on the anvils of
reasonableness with respect to the object of preventing infringement, it would run
afoul of the proscription under Section 3, and would therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Competition Commission. Support for this position may be drawn
from the recommendations of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy
and Law (also known as "the S.V.S. Raghavan Committee Report") published
in the year 2000. Extracted below is the relevant recommendation of the said
Committee with respect to application of the Competition law to the conduct of
IP owners:
"5.1.8 There is,in some cases, a dichotomy between Intellectual
Property Rights and Competition Policy/Law. The former
endangers competition while the latter engenders competition.
There is a need to appreciate the distinction between the existence of a right and its exercise. During the exercise of a right,
ifany anti-competitive trade practice or conduct is visible to
the detriment of consumer interest or public interest, it ought to
be assailedunder the Competition Policy/Law." 0
Evidently, Section 3(5) embodies this recommendation since it strikes a balance between protection of IP and prevention of anti-competitive practices
1o
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employed under the garb of IP protection. This position was reiterated in the
erstwhile Planning Commission's Report of the Working Group on Competition
Policy published in the year 2007. Extracted below is the relevant observation of
the Working Group on IP Policy:
"4.1.13 JPR laws in India have provisions to take care of these
potential JPR related competition abuses, including the provision for compulsory licensing. The Competition Act, 2002 does
have a specific provision to deal with anticompetitive behaviour arising out of unreasonable restraintimposed by a holder
of intellectual property beside being a factor to be considered
while determining 'dominance of an enterprise' attained under
a statute in the relevant market.""
The above extracted observation of the Working Group is consistent with the
recommendations of the Expert Committee, the language of Section 3(5) and this
author's interpretation of the provision. In other words, although CLs under the
Patents Act may be granted to remedy an anti-competitive practice of a patentee,
the Competition Act retains the power to adjudicate on the legality of the patentee's conduct. Pertinently, the observation of the Working Group also alludes
to the application of the Competition Act to the conduct of an IP owner who
enjoys a position of dominance in the relevant market. This is a clear reference
to abuse of dominance by an IP owner within the meaning of Section 4 of the
Competition Act.
This observation is supported by the phraseology of Section 4 and the framework of the Competition Act. Section 4 of the Competition Act mandates that no
enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position. 2 It is surprising that, unlike
Section 3, there is no reference to a "person" in Section 4 since an individual
right owner too could enjoy a position of dominance which is unaffected by market forces. That being said, what is pertinent to the instant discussion is Section
19(4), which lists the factors the Competition Commission shall have regard for
in inquiring whether an enterprise enjoys a position of dominance for the purposes of Section 4. In particular, Clause (g) of Section 19(4) expressly speaks of
monopoly or dominant position "whether acquired as a result of any statute" or
by virtue of being a Government company or a public sector undertaking or "otherwise".' 3 Further, Clause (m)is an omnibus clause which speaks of "any other
4
factor which the Commission may consider relevantfor the inquiry".'
Based on the two aforementioned clauses, it would be fair to argue that the
phrase monopolies "acquired as a result of any statute" encompasses within
PLANNING COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON COMPETITION POLICY,
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its broad ambit exclusive and exclusionary rights such as IPRs. Put simply, the
conduct of a patentee who enjoys a dominant position by virtue of her/his ownership of a patent or a portfolio of patents falls squarely within the realm of
inquiry by the Competition Commission. This is an unequivocal recognition of
the potential for distortion of the market's competitive landscape by an abusive
dominant patentee. This is made further evident by Section 4(2)(b) which deals
with restriction of technical/scientific development by a dominant enterprise. 5 It
is clear from the above discussion that the Competition Act expressly deals with
anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominance by a patentee. The issue that
needs to be addressed next is the practical distribution of adjudication between
the Competition Act and the Patents Act.
IV. ALLOCATION OF ROLES BETWEEN
THE COMPETITION COMMISSION AND
THE CONTROLLER OF PATENTS
It must be noted that in granting a CL under Section 84 of the Patents Act,
6
the Controller of Patents regulates and tempers the exercise of patent rights.
However, this enquiry does not take into account the distortion of competition in the market. That question is the exclusive preserve of the Competition
Commission, as is evident from Section 18 of the Competition Act.' 7 In other
words, the nature of inquiry in the two fora is fundamentally different. While
the Controller of Patents is seized of an inter partes or in personam proceeding
under Section 84 of the Patents Act which results in the grant of a license, the
Competition Commission under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act has a
broader purview which addresses a patentee's market practices and the conduct of
a dominant patentee with a view to preserve the market's competitive landscape.
Clearly, the latter proceeding is not and cannot be treated as adversarial in the
conventional sense since it is an in rem inquiry. This in personam nature of a
CL proceeding is further demonstrated by the fact that only a "person interested"
may apply for a CL under the Patents Act and under Section 93 of the Act a CL
is deemed to be a licence deed executed by the parties. 8 This contrasts starkly
with the proceeding under the Competition Act which may be initiated by any
person or even by the Commission suo motu.
In addition to the distinction in the nature of inquiry under the two legislations, the Competition Act contains express provisions which clarify its position
in relation to other legislations. In two specific provisions, the Competition Act
sets out its position with respect to (a) legislations which are not in conflict with
it and (b) those that are at loggerheads with it. The first provision is Section 62,
Competition Act, S. 4 (2002).
16 Patents Act, S. 84 (1970).
Competition Act, S. 18 (2002).
Patents Act, S. 93 (1970).
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which expressly states that the provisions of the Competition Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being
in force. 9 Therefore, assuming that there is indeed an overlap between Sections
3 and 4 of the Competition Act on the one hand, and Section 84 of the Patents
Act on the other, the former shall be available to an aggrieved party in addition
to the remedies available under the latter. Simply stated, Section 62 is a departure
from the conventional principle of the specific legislation prevailing over the general since it posits the Competition Act as an additional remedy available to an
affected party without diluting the remedies the party may be entitled to invoke
under the Patents Act.
The second provision is Section 60 of the Competition Act which states
in no uncertain terms that the Act shall have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time
being in force.20 In other words, if Section 84 of the Patents Act is interpreted
as being in conflict with or inconsistent to the Competition Act, it is the latter
that shall prevail by virtue of Section 60. Pertinently, there are no provisions in
the Patents Act which are comparable to Sections 60 and 62 of the Competition
Act. Therefore, arguably the Competition Act is the more specific and appropriate
legislation in so far as a market-related inquiry into the conduct of a patentee is
concerned.
Having said the above, it is important to understand the operational implications of the above interpretation. If the Competition Act is treated as prevailing
over the Patents Act by virtue of Section 60, it follows that an inquiry into an
anti-competitive practice of a patentee or abuse of dominance by the patentee
is the sole preserve of the Competition Commission. If the Commission were
to arrive at an adverse finding with respect to the patentee, such finding may
be relied upon by an aggrieved party to either seek consequential reliefs under
Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act, or to apply for a CL under Section 84
of the Patents Act based on the findings of the Commission. Should the aggrieved
party opt for the latter, under Section 90(1)(ix) of the Patents Act, the Controller
of Patents is required to have due regard to the findings of the Commission in
prescribing the terms and conditions of the CL. In the alternative, subsequent to
the Commission's finding of contravention of Sections 3 or 4 by the patentee, the
aggrieved party or the Commission may invoke Section 21A of the Competition
2
Act and refer the matter to the Controller of Patents for grant of a CL. 1
Subsequent to the grant of the CL by the Controller, the Commission may pronounce a final decision based on the Controller's decision in the CL application.
Similarly, if an aggrieved party were to approach the Controller of Patents
for a CL under Section 84 of the Patents Act, as opposed to informing the
19 Competition Act, S. 62 (2002).
Competition Act, S. 60 (2002).
21 Competition Act, S. 21A (2002).
20
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Commission of the alleged violation of Sections 3 or 4 of the Competition Act
by the patentee, it is possible for the aggrieved party to seek a reference under
Section 21 of the Competition Act or for the Controller of Patents to refer the
matter to the Commission for a finding with respect to the patentee's conduct under Sections 3 or 4 of the Competition Act. Post the receipt of the
Commission's findings, the Controller of Patents may grant a CL based on such
findings. In other words, the Competition Act envisages and facilitates interactive regulation between the Competition Commission and other statutory authorities wherever necessary. Therefore, it would be simplistic to treat the Competition
Commission and the Controller of Patents as mutually exclusive authorities/fora
who operate in silos.
V. ALLOCATION OF ROLES BETWEEN A CIVIL
COURT AND THE COMPETITION COMMISSION
The issue of allocation of roles between a civil court and the Competition
Commission assumes importance since it poses a different practical concern altogether. The specific question that merits consideration is whether the initiation of
a civil suit for infringement instituted by the patentee or a proceeding for revocation of a patent by the defendant may result in preclusion of the Competition
Commission's jurisdiction on issues relating to the patentee's conduct. It is critical to understand that jurisdiction of a forum over a subject-matter is decided
based on the provisions of the legislation that govern it and the prima facie satisfaction of jurisdictional facts in a given case which cloak the forum with jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Therefore, if the conduct of the patentee prima
facie warrants the assumption of jurisdiction by the Competition Commission, the
institution or pendency of a civil suit or any other proceeding cannot result in
ouster of the Commission's jurisdiction.
Importantly, the nature of inquiry again differs significantly between a
civil court seized of a suit for patent infringement under the Patents Act and
the Competition Commission seized of an action under Sections 3 or 4 of the
Competition Act. The Suit Court's primary mandate is to examine the validity of
the asserted patent, test the patentee's claim of infringement and assess if the patentee is entitled to the reliefs available under the Patents Act. Except for the limited window available under Section 140(3) of the Patents Act, which permits the
defendant to raise as a defence a restrictive covenant imposed on it by the patentee, the defences available to the defendant are limited to invalidity and non-infringement of the patent. Clearly, the Suit Court is not empowered to look into
the effect of the conduct of the patentee on the competition in the market since
the Patents Act does not provide for such an inquiry. As noted previously, such
an inquiry is the exclusive domain of the Competition Commission. This is further corroborated by Section 61 of the Competition Act which excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts with respect to any matter which the Commission or the
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Competition Appellate Tribunal are empowered by the Competition Act to look
into. 22 Therefore, initiation or pendency of suit proceedings cannot come in the
way of initiation of proceedings against the patentee under the Competition Act
by the defendant in the suit.
That being said, it is certainly possible to conceive of situations or circumstances where the Suit Court may have to await a finding by the Commission
before adjudicating on issues before it. For instance, a patentee may sue a licensee for infringement of its patent based on a breach of a contractual obligation. In
response, the defendant could invoke Section 140(3) of the Patents Act and allege
that the obligation cast on it was unlawful within the meaning of the said provision and that therefore, violation of an unlawful obligation would not amount
to infringement. It is pertinent to understand that the defendant may raise the
said defence in the suit proceeding and simultaneously approach the Competition
Commission for adjudication on the legality of the obligation under Sections 3 or
4 of the Competition Act. In such a situation, since Section 140(3) is unclear with
respect to the Suit Court's power to adjudicate on the legality of the contractual
obligation, the defendant could legitimately rely on Section 61 of the Competition
Act and seek suspension of the suit proceedings pending an outcome from the
Competition Commission under Sections 3 or 4. In the alternative, the defendant may request the Suit Court to proceed with adjudication of other outstanding issues and take up the issue of infringement subsequent to a finding by the
Competition Commission.
This example serves to illustrate the point that even if there is an overlap in
the issues before a civil court and the Competition Commission, the civil court
cannot assume jurisdiction over such issues and must await the findings of the
Commission on issues which the latter is exclusively empowered to deal with.
Since neither the Patents Act nor the Competition Act formally recognizes a
distinction between a "normal patent" and a patent claimed to be "Standard
Essential", it would be reasonable to argue that even in the case of Standard
Essential Patents (SEPs), the exclusive power of the Competition Commission to
preside over market or competition-related inquiries cannot be usurped by any
other forum. In fact, it could be argued that competition-related concerns arising
of assertion of SEPs lend themselves better to the jurisdiction of the Competition
Commission given the implications of enforcement of SEPs for other stakeholders, including end consumers, in the relevant market.
VI. CONCLUSION
IP statutes, without a doubt, provide for internal corrective mechanisms to
address inequities arising out of non-use or abuse of IP rights. However, the
scope of analysis undertaken under these mechanisms is limited to verification!
22 Competition Act, S. 61 (2002).
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examination of achievement of the specific objectives of IP statutes. In other
words, these mechanisms lack the sweep and catholicism of a market-based
assessment of the actions of an IP owner under the Competition Act. No single IP
regulator, be it the Controller of Patents or the Copyright Board, is charged with
the duties of the Commission as reflected in Section 18 of the Competition Act,
or is vested with the vast powers of the Commission to deal with market mischief. Therefore, given that the specific object of the Competition Act is to foster
sustainable competition in the market, protect the interest of consumers and to
ensure freedom of trade, the Competition Commission must be allowed to fulfil
its mandate unhindered.

